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Nvidia and why rockstar CEOs challenge the board

Jensen Huang Wide2

Reading time: 6 minutes
Summary:
Nvidia went 33 years without a chair and had never publicly named a successor to Jensen Huang. His resignation shows how a high-profile chief executive can weaken the guardrails a board depends on.

Even by the frenetic standards of AI news the story of Jensen Huang’s resignation, and the campaign to bring him back, is dizzying.

The famous leather jacket wearing CEO was backed by the Nvidia board on 8 November amid allegations of an affair with a woman US intelligence suspected of spying for China, four days later he resigned. Four days after that prominent tech figures supported a petition asking the board to reinstate him, with two prominent investors urging them to do so.

Understandably, the corporate governance of Nvidia has come under intense scrutiny, with governance professionals asking if the correct guardrails have been in place.

Independence and succession under the spotlight

In 2024 Huang revealed that the company’s leadership team of 60 people all reported directly to him, he commented: “It’s not conventional, but I am certain it’s the best practice.”  The company’s unconventional approach included no chair of the board for 33 years, the firm only appointing one on the day Huang resigned. This was Harvey C. Jones, a director since 1993, who worked with Huang for three decades.

The UK’s Corporate Governance Code expects an independent chair and identifies more than nine years’ board service as a circumstance likely to impair, or could appear to impair, a non-executive director’s independence. In its 2026 proxy statement, Nvidia designated that two of its independent directors had served since the company was founded in 1993, and a third since 1997.

Succession planning was not a priority as Nvidia never publicly named a successor and the lack of a plan appears to be Huang’s own preference. The New York Times reported, citing former executives, that discussions about a plan had gone on inside the company for several years but Huang had resisted them.

Robert Armstrong, the Financial Times’ US financial commentator described the lack of a succession plan as “a massive scandal”, arguing that overseeing this was “perhaps the most important job of a corporate board.

Pressure on the board

Questions have also been raised about how long it took the board to act. The New York Times reported on Huang and his close friendship with an executive at Nvidia customer Megaspeed in October 2025, with Wired reporting Huang was working with crisis PR firm Heller that month.

The story that created the media storm was in late October 2026 when the New York Times reported that US intelligence agencies had concluded that Alice Huang, a Megaspeed executive close to Huang, was passing information to Beijing. China denies this. The board was reluctant to act on this, Bloomberg has reported.

One of the reasons it was spurred into action was through the intervention of Timothy Teter, Nvidia’s General Counsel and Secretary. Bloomberg reports that he visited Huang’s house soon after 6 November following a Financial Times report that Huang’s relationship was romantic. He raised the reports with him and Huang confessed. At that point, Bloomberg reports, the board still did not want to take a public stance, but Teter, the secretary of the board, told them they had to.

There are a number of other examples of large company’s high-profile CEO causing a governance crisis. One example is Carlos Ghosn who was a celebrated chief executive credited with rescuing Nissan from near-collapse and then running Renault, Nissan and Mitsubishi as a single alliance. In November 2018, by then Nissan's chairman, he was arrested in Tokyo over alleged financial misconduct, including the under-reporting of his pay. He has always denied the charges and in 2019 fled Japan for Lebanon before any trial. A special committee set up to review Nissan’s governance concluded that the "root cause of the misconduct was the concentration of all authority in Mr. Ghosn."

It can be argued that, with Huang’s resignation, Nvidia’s guardrails engaged in the end. While on 17 November the board said it "does not intend to reinstate Jensen as CEO". Nine days earlier it had expressed "confidence in Jensen and his leadership team". A board statement reflects what directors know on the day it is issued. With a petition, vocal investors and congressional hearings in early December, that pressure on Nvidia's board has not gone away. The question for any board with a high-profile CEO is whether its own guardrails would hold in a crisis.

What boards can take from Nvidia

•            Independent voice. A director can meet the formal test and still be too close to the chief executive to challenge them. Nvidia classed every director except Huang as independent, yet Bloomberg describes a board dominated by his longtime investors, business partners and friends.

•            Succession planning. Former executives told the New York Times that Huang resisted discussions about a succession plan. If a chief executive is reluctant, the board should set a deadline and come back to it every year.

•            Crisis response. Plan who speaks for the board and what would trigger a public statement.

•            Company secretary’s direct line to the board. The secretary serves the board and the company as a whole.